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I 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
 nternational Humanitarian Law (IHL) has developed largely through a 
pluralistic process.1 Its earliest codifications were inspired in no small part 
by religious and moral thinking.2 Secular academic writers soon joined the 
process, making central contributions that are still cited as authoritative 
centuries later.3 All the while, States published and refined military manuals 
and articles of war to instruct their armed forces in rules for the conduct of 
warfare.4 By the late nineteenth century, States began to codify accepted 
expressions of IHL that accounted broadly for military custom, as well as 
notions of humanity, in a budding corpus of positive international law.5 
The compounded horrors of new weapons and industrial-scale battlefields 
fueled this and further codification.6 While the twentieth century saw 
treaties take pride of place among IHL sources, customary international 
law, judgments of military and international tribunals, military legal 
                                                                                                                      
1. LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26–64 (3d ed. 
2008); Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 15–35 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008); see 
generally GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980). 
2. See generally G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the Historical 
Development of the Law of War, 5 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 3 (1965). 
3. See generally M. H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (Michael 
Hurst ed., 1965). 
4. The paradigmatic example is the Lieber Code approved by President Lincoln for 
use by the Union Army during the U.S. Civil War. Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted 
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 2004); Rick 
Beard, The Lieber Codes, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://opinionator. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/the-lieber-codes/. 
5. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; The Hague Con-
vention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regu-
lations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 
187 Consol. T.S. 429. 
6. This dynamic was represented most notably by the work of Henri Dunant. See 
PIERRE BOISSIER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: 
FROM SOLFERINO TO TSUSHIMA 19–25 (1985) (describing the gruesome aftermath of the 
Battle of Solferino that Dunant described in a book that was to inspire the creation of the 
International Red Cross). 
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doctrine, and humanitarian and academic commentary also helped to shape 
the content and evolution of IHL.7 
Pluralism, however useful at accounting for diverse interests, has not 
come without cost. Despite prolonged attention and development, IHL 
exhibits a high degree of ambiguity. Few legal disciplines rival the 
indeterminacy of IHL. As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, then Whewell Professor 
of International Law at the University of Cambridge and later judge on the 
International Court of Justice, famously observed, “if international law is, 
in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even 
more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”8 
Confronted with a cacophony of inputs—private and public, military and 
civilian, domestic and international—the IHL lawyer frequently finds 
clarity and consensus elusive. Sorting IHL noise from notes requires 
considerable legal, military, and political experience. The content and 
operation of even cardinal IHL principles such as distinction remain 
subject to voluble debate. 
While a measure of its indeterminacy is surely attributable to IHL’s 
pluralistic process of development, an equal measure must be traced to the 
unique and peculiar purpose of IHL. IHL is a body of law that 
countenances intentional killing and deprivation of liberty on a grand scale 
in pursuit of national interests, which may not be benign. It expressly 
allows for the deaths of innocents and destruction of their property to 
achieve military aims, while imposing obligations and requiring precautions 
that can expose combatants to tangibly greater danger. Yet, IHL also 
humanizes bloody battlefields. When respected, it can save lives and ensure 
humane treatment, preserving a degree of humanity in both the victims and 
victors of war. 
In light of these competing dynamics, the interpretation and 
development of IHL must be handled delicately. A highly reactive body of 
law, IHL has seen evolutionary and even revolutionary changes instituted 
by States following armed conflicts—the classic example being adoption of 
the four Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of the Second World War.9 
                                                                                                                      
7. See generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994). 
8. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 382 (1952). 
9. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
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Those with the expertise and experience to fully appreciate the fragile IHL 
balance between military necessity and humanity that provides its 
foundational raison d’etre have been the key drivers of this process of 
change.10 Historically, States, and their military representatives in particular, 
have played this critical role in shaping the contours of IHL. To be sure, 
proposals by academics and non-governmental organizations have fostered 
significant enhancements of IHL. But this has occurred only after 
deliberate and studied consideration and acceptance by government experts 
and States uniquely positioned to evaluate the operational and even 
strategic costs of legal innovation. The result was an IHL reasonably 
assured to reflect the best achievable balance of military necessity and 
humanity—an IHL at once acceptable to the States and armed forces 
charged with its implementation and to the advocates for war’s inevitable 
victims. 
While the IHL dialogue remains vigorous, continuation of its pluralistic 
nature appears in doubt. In particular, a void of State participation, 
especially with respect to opinio juris, has formed. One no longer finds 
regular State expressions of IHL opinio juris. Nor does one regularly find 
comprehensive and considered responses by States to the proposals and 
pronouncements of non-State IHL participants. In many respects, as this 
article will demonstrate, the guns of State IHL opinio juris have fallen silent. 
Meanwhile, non-State IHL actors have been undeterred, even 
emboldened. The IHL contributions of the international legal academy 
have been particularly voluminous. Some are of exceptional quality. 
However, academia has also incentivized the production of decidedly 
unconventional IHL perspectives. While useful to illustrate or deconstruct 
normative architecture, many such efforts not only eschew rigorous legal 
analysis, but also display insensitivity to the realities of battle in favor of 
interpretive creativity or innovation. Indeed, many authors and pundits 
                                                                                                                      
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1950). 
10. See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795, 
806–22 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Military Necessity] (describing the discourse among 
States and military leaders, humanitarian NGOs, and nascent international courts and tri-
bunals in shaping IHL’s response to military necessity concerns). 
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boldly masquerade legal innovations as accepted understandings of IHL.11 
Even more troubling is the fact that many scholars lacking the appropriate 
education or experiential background have responded to the fact that IHL 
is a topic au courant by claiming IHL expert status. Their work product 
misstates basic principles and rules with distressing frequency, and they are 
too often set forth in an ad hominem manner. All of these contributions, 
from the superb to the sub-standard, exert informal but real pressure on 
the shape of IHL. 
Further complicating the IHL process, while helping to drown out 
what little State opinio juris one finds today, are the burgeoning efforts of 
humanitarian advocacy groups. These organizations and their members 
have long performed the valuable role of counterweight, urging States not 
to lead the law unduly askew in the pursuit of narrow national interests. 
Yet, assertions of law by humanitarian groups must be considered with 
some degree of care as their work in explicating IHL understandably (and 
often appropriately) reflects the legal causes and policies of their 
constituencies. Additionally, where they stand with respect to IHL depends 
on where they sit; what they observe and conclude about the battlefield and 
its law is always a function of their perceived mandates. Humanitarian 
activists working exclusively to alleviate the suffering of civilians and other 
protected persons will inevitably appreciate IHL differently than, for 
instance, soldiers charged with winning a battle or State policy-makers 
responsible for leading a nation to victory. 
Other non-State entities also indirectly, but effectively, shape IHL. 
Foremost among these is the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). The ICRC is undoubtedly the most influential single body in the 
field; indeed, few organizations or States field the IHL expertise or 
experience of its impressive Legal Division. However, in assessing issues 
arising from the military necessity-humanity balance, the ICRC 
unsurprisingly (and again often appropriately) tends to resolve grey areas in 
favor of humanitarian considerations, much as militaries usually do vis-à-
vis military necessity. The United Nations Human Rights Council has also 
now included IHL matters within its portfolio. Although the Council’s 
efforts have sometimes reflected a misunderstanding of IHL and 
                                                                                                                      
11. Of particular note is the IHL blogosphere that has recently materialized. It serves 
to conveniently highlight emerging issues and provides a first glimpse of IHL analysis. 
However, bloggers are frequently unable to offer the depth or expertise called for by 
complex IHL issues. 
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inappropriately conflated IHL and human rights law,12 more recent work 
has proved quite sophisticated and well measured.13 And, of course, the 
growing number of international tribunals—standing, ad hoc, and 
bifurcated—that also pronounce on the scope and meaning of IHL, often 
in confounding prolixity, must be added to this complex admixture of non-
State influences on IHL content and vector. 
In the face of these and other influences, it is essential to recall that 
States, and only States, “make” IHL.14 They alone enjoy legal competency to 
interpret international law beyond the confines of a particular case. States 
do so either through treaty or through “general practice accepted as law,” 
the latter component known as customary international law.15 As will be 
explained, expressions of opinio juris operate as the fulcrum around which 
new customary humanitarian law norms crystallize, as well as a basis for the 
contextual interpretation and development of existing treaty and customary 
IHL principles and rules. 
Expressions of opinio juris are a tool by which States regulate the 
emergence, interpretation, and evolution of legal norms. Effectively 
employed, they may maximize achievement and protection of States’ 
perceived national interests. By failing regularly to offer such expressions, 
States risk unintended Grotian Moments, that is, “radical developments in 
which new rules and doctrines of customary international law emerge with 
                                                                                                                      
12. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab 
Territories: Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 284, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (“A convergence between human rights protections and 
humanitarian law protections is also in operation. The rules contained in Article 75 of 
Additional Protocol I (AP I), which reflect customary law, define a series of fundamental 
guarantees and protections, such as the prohibitions against torture, murder and inhuman 
conditions of detention, recognized also under human rights law.”). 
13. See generally Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 10, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter Emmerson Report]; Human 
Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter Heyns Report]. 
14. But see, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: 
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 107, 109 (2012) (“[I]t is worth questioning whether nonstate armed 
groups can and should be given a role in the creation of the international law that governs 
conflicts to which they are parties.”). 
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see generally THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORI-
CAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard 
Murphy eds., 2009). 
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unusual rapidity and acceptance.”16 Such episodes do not necessarily create 
“bad” law, nor do they always run contrary to States’ interests or 
intentions, but they often represent brief periods when States’ ability to 
reason objectively is at its nadir. They are therefore a suboptimal time for 
States to engage in activities that amount to norm formation and 
development. 
This article sets forth thoughts regarding the performance of States, 
particularly the United States, in this informal process of meta-norm 
formation and evolution. The objective is to identify recent tendencies in 
the process that might foreshadow how IHL is likely to develop absent a 
reversal of current trends. Our examination suggests that non-State actors 
are outpacing and, in some cases displacing, State action in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms. States seem reticent to offer expressions 
of opinio juris, often for good reasons. We argue that such reticence comes 
at a costdiminished influence on the content and application of IHL. In 
our view, States have underestimated this cost and must act to resume their 
intended role in the process. 
 
II. OPINIO JURIS 
 
State assessments of international law have long held a critical place in the 
law of nations. More than mere commentary, States’ expressions of the 
perceived extent and content of their international legal obligations are key 
constitutive elements of international law. In particular, expressions of 
opinio juris, when combined with evidence of general State practice, form 
the basis of binding customary law.17 Like treaties and general principles of 
law, customary law is a primary component of international law.18 Absent 
meaningful and regular expressions of opinio juris by States, prospective 
customary law founders and extant customary law stagnates. 
                                                                                                                      
16. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDA-
MENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 1 (2013). The attacks of 9/11 
undoubtedly generated one such moment for jus ad bellum. 
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (Robert Jennings 
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM] (“[T]he formulation in the 
[ICJ] Statute serves to emphasize that the substance of [international custom] of interna-
tional law is to be found in the practice of states.”). 
18. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (stating that the International Court of Justice should consult 
customary international law when resolving disputes). 
 
 
 
 State Opinio Juris and International Humanitarian Law Pluralism 2015 
178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinio juris also animates the interpretation and application of IHL 
treaties.19 As noted in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” 
is a relevant consideration when interpreting a treaty’s provisions.20 Opinio 
juris serves as the vessel through which said agreement is revealed.21 
Moreover, when the context in which treaty provisions apply changes, 
subsequent expressions of opinio juris as to their application in the new 
environment, combined with corresponding State practice in their 
implementation, are the mechanisms by which treaty law remains 
relevant.22 
Expressions of opinio juris are especially meaningful with respect to 
emerging domains of State interaction not anticipated when the present law 
emerged in the form of either treaty or customary law.23 For instance, few 
such domains rival cyberspace conflict in this regard.24 It is understandable, 
therefore, that scholars and non-State organizations lavish attention on the 
question of how international law regulates cyber operations.25 States, 
                                                                                                                      
19. See Yoram Dinstein, The Interaction between Customary International Law and Treaties, 
322 RECUEIL DES COURS 243 (2006) (discussing the relationship between treaties and cus-
tomary international law). 
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
21. Id. 
22. See generally id. 
23. See id. art. 38 (“Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty 
from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recog-
nized as such.”). 
24. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, The Emergence of Legal Norms for Cyber Conflict, in 
BINARY BULLETS: THE ETHICS OF CYBERWARFARE (Fritz Allhoff et al., 2015) (forthcom-
ing). 
25. E.g., MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (2014); NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, PEACETIME 
REGIME FOR ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS, AND DIPLOMACY (Katarina Ziolkowski ed., 2013); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer 
Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (2002); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected 
Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 1145 (2003); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber Attack, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 
RED CROSS (forthcoming) [hereinafter Schmitt, Rewired Warfare], available at http:// pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472800; Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of 
Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW 269 (2014); Scott 
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unfortunately, seem to be falling behind. This reflects a broad trend that 
has been underway with respect to IHL generally for some time.26 
 
III. OPINIO JURIS AVERSION 
 
While there are frequently valid reasons for States’ failure to offer clear, 
unequivocal indications of the practices they have undertaken or refrained 
from (or express their views on the actions of other States) out of a sense 
of international legal obligation,27 risks attend inaction. Of greatest 
significance is the risk of legal vacuums left to be filled by actors who lack 
the de jure authority but not willingness to do so. 
This willingness is especially evident with regard to IHL. Over recent 
decades, there has been a flurry of activity by non-State actors seeking to 
advance views of how IHL is to be interpreted and applied, and how it 
should develop.28 Efforts by humanitarian and other non-governmental 
organizations, international tribunals, and academics have proved 
tremendously influential in this fecund normative environment,29 one in 
which States have largely remained mute.30 A brief examination of some of 
the more noteworthy instances illustrates the nature of this dynamic and 
presages how events may unfold if States do not engage proactively in the 
                                                                                                                      
Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (2009). 
26. See, e.g., Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 14, at 108 (describing how States are 
“particularly hostile” to granting non-State actors any lawmaking power in international 
law); Schmitt, Military Necessity, supra note 10, at 811–14 (describing various States’ appre-
hension regarding the adoption number of treaties adopted by international law). 
27. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris and Law of Armed Conflict Pluralism, JUST 
SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1870/reviving-opinio-juris-law-armed-
conflict-pluralism-2/ [hereinafter Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris] (explaining how an official 
of the federal government always prefaces his or her remarks with a “pro forma reminder 
that nothing [he or] she will say necessarily reflects the views” of his or her agency or the 
U.S. government on any international matters). 
28. See, e.g., Schmitt, Military Necessity, supra note 10, at 822 (“Nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) have increasingly moved from oversight and advocacy of human right 
into the field of international humanitarian law. In particular, a number of prominent or-
ganizations have begun to issue reports on IHL compliance during armed conflicts.”). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 816–37 (describing how NGOs, international tribunals, and academ-
ic writings have influenced the development of international law). 
30. See, e.g., Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris, supra note 27 (describing how States’ lack of 
participation in the dialogue regarding law of armed conflict is in contrast to the thriving 
commentary of non-States). 
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application of IHL to new means and methods of warfare during armed 
conflict. 
The ICRC has led a number of recent efforts to clarify and 
progressively develop IHL.31 More than a private humanitarian relief 
organization, the ICRC has long held a special place in the field.32 It is 
commonly referred to as the “guardian of international humanitarian 
law.”33 Reflecting its mandate “to work for the understanding and 
dissemination of knowledge of international humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflicts and to prepare any development thereof,”34 the ICRC has 
recently published two highly influential studies and is in the process of 
producing a third.35 Each has been, or is likely soon to be, viewed as a 
dependable expression of customary IHL, relied on by jurists and IHL 
practitioners, including State legal advisers.36 Yet, as this Section will 
illustrate, the studies have provoked no serious response on the part of 
States and States have launched no comparable efforts of their own. 
In 1995, the ICRC commissioned its Legal Division to conduct a large-
scale study to codify “customary rules of IHL applicable in international 
and non-international armed conflicts.”37 Carried out over a span of ten 
                                                                                                                      
31. See Yves Sandoz, The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of Internation-
al Humanitarian Law, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (Dec. 31, 1998) https://www.icrc 
.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm (“In short, [the ICRC] 
has made a very direct contribution to the process of codification, during which its pro-
posals were examined, and which has led to regular revision and extension of international 
humanitarian law . . . .”). 
32. Id.; see generally BOISSIER, supra note 6; ANDRÉ DURAND, HISTORY OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: FROM SARAJEVO TO HIROSHIMA (1984); 
CAROLINE MOOREHEAD, DUNANT’S DREAM: WAR, SWITZERLAND AND THE HISTORY OF 
THE RED CROSS (1998). 
33. Sandoz, supra note 31. 
34. Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross art. 4(g), Oct. 3 2013, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm. 
35. 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Nov. 
28–Dec. 1, 2011, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Con-
flicts, 3, 31IC/11/5.1.2 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ICRC Challenges]. 
36. See infra note 41 and accompanying text; cf. Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Target-
ing, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW 131, 168 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
Schmitt, Law of Targeting] (discussing the acceptance by States of general targeting Rules set 
forth in the Study “as a correct enunciation” of targeting norms). 
37. 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Dec. 
3–7, 1995, International Humanitarian Law: From Law to Action-Report on the Follow-up to the 
International Conference on the Protection of War Victims, Annex II, in 78 INTERNATIONAL RE-
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years in consultation with over 150 legal experts, the resulting Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study (the Study) includes three volumes of 
work, running to well over 3,000 pages.38 The Study is a work of 
breathtaking breadth and depth, one deeply rooted in a conscientious effort 
to discern State practice and opinio juris applicable to armed conflict.39 It has 
been profoundly influential and is regularly cited by courts and 
commentators as authoritative on a number of points relating to the state 
of customary IHL.40 
Considering the importance of the topics addressed, the 
comprehensiveness of its coverage, and the fact that the ICRC regularly 
informed States of its work, one might have expected the Study to rouse 
strong reactions from States, either in the form of approval or detailed 
disagreement therewith.41 It did not. On the contrary, most States remained 
silent, thereby begging the question of whether the majority of States are of 
the view that the ICRC “got it right.” 
The United States was one of only a few States to respond to the Study. 
Shortly after publication, the Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department 
                                                                                                                      
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 58, 84 (1996) [hereinafter ICRC, From Law to Action]. 
38. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARI-
AN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter 1 CUS-
TOMARY IHL STUDY]; 2 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [here-
inafter 2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; 3 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter 3 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY]; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments, 89 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 473, 474 (2007) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Response]. Volume I of 
the Study features 161 Rules and accompanying commentary. 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY. 
Volumes II and III compile an impressive catalogue of support for the Study’s rules and 
commentary. 2 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY; 3 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY. An online database 
supplements these volumes, regularly updating its sourcing and citations. Customary IHL: 
Practice, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2 (last visited Apr. 30, 
2015). 
39. Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 36 IS-
RAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (2006). 
40. See, e.g., id. 
41. The Study provoked significant commentary from jurists and academic commen-
tators. See generally id.; George H. Aldrich, Customary International Humanitarian Law—An 
Interpretation on Behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 76 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 503 (2005). Chatham House conducted a year-long study on the 
Study that resulted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007). 
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and the General Counsel to the U.S. Department of Defense published a 
joint 22-page response to the ICRC President.42 The letter, which purports 
only to review “a cross-section” of the Study, objects chiefly to the 
methodology used to identify customary international law, in particular 
alleging the Study affords too much weight to thin or selective samples of 
State practice.43 The Legal Adviser and General Counsel also take issue 
with the Study’s approach to opinio juris, noting that only “positive 
evidence . . . that States consider themselves legally obligated” can satisfy 
the opinio juris element of customary international law.44 
Several of the letter’s criticisms are compelling, especially with respect 
to the Study’s reliance on non-binding instruments, such as United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions and the ICRC’s own prior work on IHL.45 
Overall, though, the letter lacks the thoroughness and heft expected of a 
response to such a significant and influential work. Indeed, only four pages 
of the letter provide general remarks,46 with the remainder devoted to 
comments on just four rules: respect and protection of humanitarian relief 
personnel; protection of the environment; expanding bullets; and universal 
jurisdiction.47 Many experts in the field were surprised the United States 
would issue such a letter and select only four relatively peripheral topics to 
address, while avoiding such core issues as the law governing attacks or 
detention.48 
To be fair, the U.S. letter notes that the Study’s length precluded a full 
review so soon after publication. The letter states, “The United States will 
continue its review and expects to provide additional comments or 
otherwise make its views known in due course.”49 Yet in the intervening 
eight years, the United States has offered no further official comment on 
                                                                                                                      
42. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007). 
43. Id. at 444–45. 
44. Id. at 447. 
45. E.g., id. at 457. 
46. See id. at 443–46 (listing general marks about methodological concerns and inter-
national law principles). 
47. Id. at 448–71 
48. See, e.g., Noura Erakat, The U.S. v. the Red Cross: Customary International Humanitarian 
Law and Universal Jurisdiction, 41 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 
225, 226 (2013) (comparing and contrasting the approach taken by the Red Cross and the 
approach favored in the U.S. response). 
49. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 444. 
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the Study and no such effort appears to be underway. Meanwhile, the 
Study continues to grow in influence, in great part because it remains the 
sole comprehensive work dedicated to discerning customary IHL available 
to jurists, scholars, and even State practitioners and legal advisors.50 While 
the ICRC may lack the de jure competency to express opinio juris, in the 
absence of State action in that regard, the organization has de facto filled 
the void. 
Between 2003 and 2008, the ICRC conducted a second major project 
aimed at developing and clarifying the legal consequences of civilian 
presence on the battlefield.51 A succession of conflicts in the Balkans 
during the 1990s led to an infusion of civilians onto the battlefield, both 
participants from the region (e.g., armed groups of civilians) and civilian 
contractors associated with foreign armed forces.52 Subsequent armed 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continued and even accelerated these 
trends.53 In response, the ICRC decided in 2003 to examine the parameters 
of an important exception to the requirement that armed forces distinguish 
between civilians and combatants and only direct violence at the latter.54 
The exception provides that civilians lose their protection from attack for 
such time as they directly participate in hostilities.55 
                                                                                                                      
50. See generally Schmitt, Law of Targeting, supra note 36, at 134–35. 
51. Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Di-
rect Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 991, 991 (2008) [hereinafter DPH Guidance]. 
52. See, e.g., Trevor A. Keck, Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of Distinc-
tion, the Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the Use of Force in 
Warfare, 211 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 115, 123–25 (2012) (discussing the increase in civil-
ian casualties in the 1990s as well as the difficulties posed by humanitarian efforts during 
the Balkan wars). 
53. See, e.g., id. at 126–27 (citing Afghanistan for exemplifying the increase in civilian 
presence on the battlefield). 
54. Civilian “Direct Participation in Hostilities”: Overview, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010), https:/ 
/www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/contemporary-challenges-for-ihl/participation-hostilities 
/overview-direct-participation.htm. 
55. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51(3), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP 
II]. The notion of direct participation is widely viewed as customary in nature. For in-
stance, the United States is a party to neither instrument, having ratified neither, but the 
concept appears in DEP’T OF THE NAVY ET AL., NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
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Participation in hostilities by civilians has long presented a host of 
humanitarian and tactical challenges.56 Civilian fighters frequently fail to 
distinguish themselves visually from the surrounding civilian population,57 a 
practice that frustrates the ability of armed forces to honor the 
foundational IHL principle of distinction.58 Civilian fighters also regularly 
shift back and forth between peaceful activities and participation in 
hostilities—the so-called, “farmer-by-day-fighter-by-night” or “revolving 
door” dilemma—thereby raising the question of when such individuals 
may be attacked.59 Although the challenge of how to deal with civilians on 
the battlefield was certainly not new in 2003,60 the ICRC recognized the 
need to clarify the underlying law and accordingly convened a group of 
international law experts to consider the matter.61 In 2008, the ICRC 
published the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation (the 
Guidance) setting forth its views on the subject.62 
The Guidance, and the process that produced it, examined the legal 
regime governing civilian direct participation in hostilities through the lens 
of the widely ratified 1977 Additional Protocols I and II (AP I for 
international armed conflict (IAC)63 and AP II for non-international armed 
                                                                                                                      
OPERATIONS, 8-3 (2007) [hereinafter NWP 1-14M]. See also 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, 
supra note 38, r. 6 (detailing civilians’ loss of protection from attack). History can also be 
used to establish custom. See Keck, supra note 52, at 117 (stating that “the obligation to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants” has been recognized as early as the 
5th century B.C.E.). 
56. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, “BETWEEN A DRONE AND AL-QAEDA”: THE CIVIL-
IAN COST OF US TARGETED KILLINGS IN YEMEN 80–81 (2013) [hereinafter CIVILIAN 
COST] (discussing civilian casualties resulting from US targeted killings in Yemen). 
57. This article uses the term “fighter” in lieu of “combatant” because combatancy is 
a concept involving issues of detention and belligerent immunity and has only derivative 
significance in the law of targeting. Moreover, the law of non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) does not include a concept of combatancy. Cf. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES 
H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC 
MANUAL] (employing the term “fighters” as opposed to “combatants” to avoid confusion 
with international law of armed conflict). 
58. AP I, supra note 55, art. 48; DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 993. 
59. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1034–36. 
60. See id. at 993 (noting that there has been “[a] continuous shift of the conduct of 
hostilities into civilian population centres” in recent decades). 
61. Id. at 991–92. 
62. Id. at 1034–37. 
63. AP I, supra note 55, art. 1(4). 
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conflict (NIAC))64 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.65 Articles in each of 
the Protocols provide: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”66 
Though undoubtedly an important concession to the realities of combat, 
and although all of the experts involved in the project agreed that the 
provisions accurately restated customary law,67 these two brief articles have 
been exceptionally difficult to interpret and implement in practice.68 The 
range of activities that constitute direct participation in hostilities and the 
temporal aspect of the exception were especially unclear to many Parties to 
the Protocols.69 Of course, the same problems attend their interpretation 
and implementation in their customary guise for non-Parties to the 
Protocols such as the United States, Pakistan, India, and Israel.70 Although 
the Guidance proposes understandings and interpretive glosses for both 
                                                                                                                      
64. AP II, supra note 55, art. 1(1). 
65. AP I, supra note 55; AP II, supra note 55. A number of militarily significant States 
have not ratified the Protocols including, inter alia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States. On the U.S. position vis-à-vis particu-
lar provisions thereof, see generally George Cadwalader Jr., The Rules Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: A Review of the Relevant Unit-
ed States References, in 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 133 (Mi-
chael N. Schmitt & Louise Arimatsu eds., 2011). 
66. AP I, supra note 55, art. 51(3); AP II, supra note 55, art. 13(3). 
67. In remarks in 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, Michael J. 
Matheson, stated, “We . . . support the principle . . . that immunity [is] not be extended to 
civilians who are taking part in hostilities.” Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Internation-
al Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Remarks at the 
6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law (Jan. 2, 1987), in 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLICY 419, 426 (1987). 
68. See id. at 510 (noting Lieutenant Colonel Burrus M. Carnahan’s statement that 
“[t]he main problem in interpreting these provisions is how much civilians must partici-
pate in the war effort before the Protocol no longer protects them” and that “[t]he stand-
ard of the Protocol . . . furnishes little clarification”). 
69. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 38, r. 6 (“It is fair to conclude . . . that 
outside the few uncontested examples . . . in particular use of weapons or other means to 
commit acts of violence against human or material enemy forces, a clear and uniform def-
inition of direct participation in hostilities has not been developed in State practice.”). 
70. See, for instance, discussion of the subject by the Israeli Supreme Court in HCJ 
769/02 Pub. Comm. against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. (2) IsrLR 459, 488–92 [2006], 
the holding of which is also summarized in Mark E. Wojcik, Introductory Note to the Public 
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 373 (2007). 
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issues,71 the ICRC was unable to secure unanimity thereon among the 
experts it had convened.72 In fact, a group of notable experts withdrew 
from the project altogether in its final months.73 
Expert dissent notwithstanding, the Guidance, as with the Customary 
International Humanitarian Law study before it, has been a markedly 
influential cynosure. For instance, it has found its way into military training 
for a number of NATO States and has affected the content of NATO rules 
of engagement in Afghanistan.74 Despite these important practical effects, 
the Guidance has not attracted any definitive and comprehensive reaction 
from States. The scarcity of sovereign responses is especially curious and 
concerning with respect to States thought to disagree with aspects of the 
Guidance. 
The United States has long embraced, albeit not publically by means of 
an expression of opinio juris, an understanding of direct participation and its 
consequences somewhat at odds with the Guidance. As an example, the 
Guidance asserts that there must be a direct causal link between the act in 
question and the harm caused to the enemy.75 If an intervening event is 
required to effect harm, the civilian in question generally has not taken 
                                                                                                                      
71. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1012–37 (describing what constitutes direct partic-
ipation in hostilities and the temporal scope of losing protection due to direct participation 
in hostilities). 
72. Id. at 992. 
73. For a published discussion on the points of contention by individuals who partic-
ipated in the project, and an ICRC response thereto, see generally Bill Boothby, “And for 
Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORK UNI-
VERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 741 (2010); Nils Melzer, Keeping 
the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSI-
TY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 831 (2010) [hereinafter Melzer, Re-
sponse]; W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Man-
date, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLICY 769 (2010) [hereinafter Parks, Part IX]; Michael N. Schmitt, 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 NEW YORK UNI-
VERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 697 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, 
Elements]; Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 641 (2010). 
74. Cf. Schmitt, Elements, supra note 73, at 699–32 (providing examples of how direct 
participation in hostilities influences military performance and conflicts in countries such 
as Iraq and Afghanistan). 
75. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 995–96. 
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direct part in hostilities and retains protection from attack.76 Most often 
cited in expert discussions as an example of how this approach would be 
implemented is the ICRC’s characterization of assembly and storage of an 
improvised explosive device (IED) as indirect participation.77 The contrary 
view is that the nexus between such activities and the subsequent IED 
attack renders those individuals engaging in the assembly and storage 
targetable as direct participants.78 Although this position has not been 
expressed in the form of opinio juris, there is State practice in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq to suggest this is the U.S. position.79 
Similar disagreement revolves around the issue of when civilians who 
participate in hostilities may be targeted. The Guidance states that the “for 
such time” language in the rules is limited to periods in which the civilian 
in question is actually engaging in “[m]easures preparatory to the execution 
of a specific act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the 
deployment to and the return from the location of its execution.”80 It goes 
on to provide that “the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection is an integral 
part, not a malfunction, of IHL.”81 In other words, the Guidance argues the 
“for such time” language should be interpreted literally as meaning that 
unless a civilian is then preparing the specific act, conducting it, or 
returning from that act, he or she is not targetable.82 U.S. practice is not in 
accord.83 From a military operational perspective, it seems irrational to 
prohibit targeting a civilian who has, perhaps on several occasions, 
conducted attacks on U.S. forces, and is likely to do so at some point in the 
future, merely because he or she has managed to return home following an 
operation and is not yet in the process of preparing a specific future 
attack.84 Unfortunately, the United States has offered no clear expressions 
                                                                                                                      
76. Id. at 1022–23. 
77. Id. at 1021–22. 
78. See Watkin, supra note 73, at 681 (“To limit direct participation to persons who 
place or detonate explosives is an artificial division of what is fundamentally a group activ-
ity.”). 
79. Cf. id. (explaining that the approach in the Guidance is impracticable in situations 
such as the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
80. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1031. 
81. Id. at 1035. 
82. See id. at 1007–08 (indicating that the “determination remains subject to all feasi-
ble precautions and to the presumption of protection in case of doubt”). 
83. Cf. Matheson, supra note 67, at 420 (describing the U.S. policy to follow interna-
tional guidance only when it is elevated to customary law status). 
84. See Melzer, Response, supra note 73, at 879 (“[Air Commodore] Boothby contends 
that the [Guidance’s] interpretation of the temporal scope of direct participation in hostili-
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of opinio juris on the matter to accompany their practice.85 In this void, the 
ICRC view is increasingly gaining traction.86 
The issue of how to treat groups of civilian fighters, as distinct from 
individuals, also remains a point of contention. In the Guidance, the ICRC 
helpfully assimilates organized armed groups not meeting the requirements 
of combatant status to the armed forces for targeting purposes.87 In other 
words, members of such groups may be targeted even when they are not 
directly participating in the hostilities.88 And because they are targetable in 
the first place, any incidental harm to them caused during an attack on 
other persons or places would not qualify as collateral damage for the 
purposes of the proportionality and precautions in attack analyses.89 
However, the Guidance restricts exposure to lawful targeting to those 
members having a “continuous combat function” in the group.90 The 
parameters of the notion are roughly analogous to those of direct 
participation. By the Guidance’s approach, the “for such time” limitation 
does not apply to individuals who have a continuous combat function in an 
organized armed group; they may be attacked at any time irrespective of 
whether they are engaging in hostilities at the moment.91 But for those 
members of the group who do not have such a function, the paradigmatic 
case being a cook who accompanies the fighters, the basic direct 
participation in hostilities rule for individuals applies such that they may 
only be attacked while so participating.92 
The ICRC acceptance of the concept of a targetable organized armed 
group goes a long way towards meeting the long-standing U.S. concerns 
                                                                                                                      
ties, and of the ensuing loss of protection, is too restrictive to make [] sense on the mod-
ern battlefield.”(internal quotations omitted)). 
85. Cf. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 446–47 (describing U.S. opposition to ex-
istence of opinio juris necessary to elevate principles in ICRC study to customary law). 
86. See Melzer, Response, supra note 73, at 909–13 (identifying recent agreement of sev-
eral States—including Israel—with some principles set forth in the DPH Guidance de-
spite U.S. reservation). 
87. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1006–09. 
88. Id. 
89. See AP I, supra note 55, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b) (describing generally 
precautions in attacks required under the protocol for civilians). 
90. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1007–08. 
91. See id. at 1007 (observing that individual membership in an organized armed group 
is contingent on a continuous combat function). 
92. See id. (“[U]nder IHL, the decisive criterion for individual membership in an orga-
nized armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group in-
volving his or her direct participation in hostilities . . . .”). 
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regarding the “revolving door.”93 Nevertheless, U.S. State practice neither 
limits targeting of a group’s members to those with a continuous combat 
function nor requires harm to other members of the group to be 
considered in the proportionality or precautions in attack analysis when 
those with a continuous combat function are attacked.94 On the contrary, 
such individuals would be treated analogously to members of the armed 
forces, that is, susceptible to lawful targeting based on mere membership in 
a group that has an express purpose of participating in the hostilities.95 
Given the importance of the issue vis-à-vis counterterrorist and 
counterinsurgency operations, one would have expected the United States 
to have staked out a firm position thereon. It has not, at least not in a 
manner that would constitute a clear expression of opinio juris on this 
important matter.96 
States’ interests in actively addressing the direct participation question 
are not limited to resolving interpretive challenges for purposes of 
targeting. The issue now appears to bear on other important IHL questions 
such as the use of civilian contractors to perform military functions more 
generally and whether civilian participation in hostilities constitutes an 
international war crime.97 This trend, unsupported by the ICRC and most 
serious IHL experts, is counter-normative.98 But more active State opinio 
                                                                                                                      
93. See generally W. Parks Hays, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW RE-
VIEW 1 (1990). 
94. See id. at 118–31 (discussing the historical development of the concept of the “re-
volving door” and the United States’ disagreement with it). 
95. Cf. 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 38, r. 6 (noting that the United States re-
jects a strict interpretation of the rule requiring the classification of an individual as a civil-
ian when his status is in doubt and acknowledges a combatant’s discretion in making such 
a classification). 
96. Cf. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 42, at 443–44 (“[T]he United States is not in a 
position to accept without further analysis that the [ICRC’s] conclusions that particular 
rules related to the laws and customs of war in fact reflect customary international law.”). 
97. See, e.g., Mark David “Max” Maxwell & Sean Watts, ‘Unlawful Enemy Combatant’: 
Legal Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 19, 20 (2007) (asserting that the classification of civilians as ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ confuses the distinct issues of legal status and culpability). But see David B. 
Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Use of Military Commissions in the War on Terror, 24 BOSTON 
UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 123, 131 (2006) (stating that the United 
States’ stance that unlawful combatants are subject “to trial and punishment by military 
tribunals” is not universally favored). 
98. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 38, r. 6 (stressing that a careful assess-
ment of a civilian should be undertaken in determining his status and that attacks against 
civilians cannot be based on the civilian merely appearing dubious). 
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juris on the direct participation question in general, and responses to the 
Guidance in particular, would greatly clarify matters. 
A further incentive for States to respond actively to the Guidance can be 
found in a controversial provision on the resort to lethal force. The 
Guidance asserts that “the kind and degree of force which is permissible 
against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not 
exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”99 Restated, attackers must resort 
to capture or other non-lethal means when feasible in the circumstances. 
As an example, 
 
an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone 
to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an attacking air force would 
probably be regarded as directly participating in hostilities. Should the 
restaurant in question be situated within an area firmly controlled by the 
opposing party, however, it may be possible to neutralize the military 
threat posed by that civilian through capture or other non-lethal means 
without additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding 
civilian population.100 
 
The approach attracted significant pushback and criticism from 
numerous prominent IHL scholars.101 Indeed, the “least harm” provision 
prompted several experts to withdraw from the project.102 Moreover, the 
provision is at odds with many States’ practice vis-à-vis conducting attacks 
and crafting rules of engagement.103 While it is common for States to 
require their forces to capture when possible, such instructions are 
motivated by the operational need to acquire actionable intelligence, not by 
any sense that they are legally obligated to do so.104 Yet, the Guidance’s 
                                                                                                                      
99. DPH Guidance, supra note 51, at 1040. 
100. Id. at 1043. 
101. See Parks, Part IX, supra note 73, at 783–85 (detailing various experts’ objections 
to the “General Restraints on the Use of Force in Direct Attack” section in the DPH 
Guidance). 
102. Id. at 784–85. 
103. See id. at 795–96 (noting that the ICRC requested the advice of senior military 
lawyers from the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada who disagreed with 
the provision on resort to lethal force and were ignored by the ICRC). 
104. See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819, 824–25 (2013) (acknowledging that critics of the 
least harm provision contend that States commonly require their forces to capture, instead 
of kill, based on “pragmatic strategic and policy choices, not legal obligations”). 
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discussion appears to have spawned a movement to entrench the least-
harmful-means requirement in contemporary IHL understandings105 and 
has sparked a lively academic debate.106 Meanwhile, State input on the issue 
has been negligible.107 It is worth considering whether States might have 
preempted the brouhaha with a more active and deliberate response to the 
Guidance in the form of an expression of opinio juris. 
Finally with respect to ICRC efforts to develop IHL, a long-term 
project is underway within the ICRC Legal Division to produce updates to 
the 1949 Geneva Convention Commentaries (the Commentaries).108 
Originally published in the decade following the Conventions’ entry into 
force,109 the current edition of the Commentaries includes a volume 
addressing each of the four Conventions in significant detail, compiling 
essential historical perspective and details of diplomatic processes that 
                                                                                                                      
105. See, e.g., id. at 819 (arguing that “the use of force should instead be governed by a 
least-restrictive-means” analysis in certain well-specified and narrow circumstances). 
106. Compare Geoffrey Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful 
Means Rule, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 536, 540 (2013) (offering a comprehensive 
rebuttal of the least harmful means interpretation), and Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Cap-
ture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EU-
ROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 855, 855 (2013) [hereinafter Schmitt, Reply to 
Ryan Goodman] (arguing that, even under narrow circumstances, there is no obligation un-
der the extant international humanitarian law to wound rather than kill enemy combatants 
nor to capture rather than kill), with Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy 
Combatants: A Rejoinder to Michael N. Schmitt, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 863, 863–66 (2013) (addressing the author’s points of agreement and disagreement 
with Michael N. Schmitt’s assertion that there exists no obligation under international 
humanitarian law to capture rather than kill enemy combatants), and Jens David Ohlin, The 
Duty to Capture, 97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1268, 1272 (2013) (examining four potential 
reasons why the duty to capture might be thought to apply to targeted killings). 
107. See Schmitt, Reply to Ryan Goodman, supra note 106, at 857 (“[S]ituations present-
ing a viable possibility of wounding instead of killing are so rare that it is counter-intuitive 
to conclude that states intended the ‘method’ language to extend to such circumstanc-
es . . . [M]ost states, non-state organizations dealing with IHL, and scholars do not inter-
pret the provision in this manner. For them, neither killing nor capture constitutes a spe-
cific method of warfare, although certain tactics designed to kill or capture do.”). 
108. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Bringing the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and Their 
Additional Protocols into the Twenty-First Century, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 1551, 1554 (2012) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century]. 
109. See id. at 1552 (“[T]he International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pro-
ceeded to write a detailed Commentary on each of their provisions. This led to the publi-
cation between 1952 and 1960 of a Commentary on each of the four Geneva Conven-
tions . . . .”). 
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produced the Conventions.110 In 1987, the ICRC added a volume of similar 
commentary on the 1977 Protocols.111 Altogether, the five volumes run to 
nearly 3,900 pages with commentary and doctrinal analysis of each of the 
articles of the four Conventions and their first two Additional Protocols.112 
The revised Commentaries will retain the format of their predecessors while 
significantly updating them with respect to interpretive developments and 
State practice.113 They are expected to occupy a staff of full-time ICRC 
legal researchers and part-time external contributors through the year 
2019.114 
Also known as Pictet’s Commentaries, after their lead editor Jean 
Pictet,115 the Commentaries, together with the 1987 commentary on the 
Additional Protocols by Yves Sandoz et al., have been leading sources of 
clarification and background on the Conventions and Protocols for 
decades.116 It is difficult to overstate their influential and nearly 
                                                                                                                      
110. E.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION 
OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED 
FORCES AT SEA (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960) [hereinafter COMMEN-
TARY: GC II]. 
111. See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
112. See generally ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORA-
TION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952); ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO 
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); 
COMMENTARY: GC II, supra note 110; ICRC, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [herein-
after COMMENTARY: GC III]; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra 
note 111. 
113. See Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108, at 1554 (“The update will 
preserve the format of the existing Commentaries . . . [and] will provide many references 
to practice, case law, and academic literature, which should facilitate further research and 
reading.”). 
114. See id. at 1554–55 (discussing the drafting process of the update to the Commen-
taries). 
115. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Pictet’s Commentaries, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PIC-
TET 495, 497 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984) (noting that “Pictet’s ‘Commentaries’—as 
they always are referred to—not only are of value because they are accessible; they are 
reliable”). 
116. See Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108, at 1553 (stating that “[o]ver 
the years, the ICRC Commentaries have come to be recognised as essential and well-
respected interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols”). 
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authoritative status. For instance, despite a clear disclaimer by the ICRC to 
the contrary, the United States Supreme Court recently cited the 
Commentaries as “the official commentaries” to the Geneva Conventions.117 
It is reasonable to expect that the forthcoming revised Commentaries will 
enjoy similarly influential and revered status as de facto “official” 
expositions on the ambiguities of the Conventions and their Protocols. At 
present, no State or collection of like-minded State legal advisors appears 
resolved or resourced to match this ICRC effort.118 
Alongside the work of the ICRC, international criminal tribunals 
increasingly contribute to the development of IHL.119 None has expounded 
on this body of law more actively or profusely than the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).120 More than a criminal 
adjudicative body, the ICTY has enthusiastically embraced a law 
declaration function.121 Since its earliest cases, the ICTY has offered 
exhaustive elaborations on perennially hazy IHL topics such as the 
                                                                                                                      
117. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). The Commentaries’ editors were 
careful to observe that 
 
 
the Commentary is the personal work of its authors. The Committee moreover, 
whenever called upon for an opinion on a provision of an international Convention, 
always takes care to emphasize that only the participant States are qualified, through 
consultation between themselves, to give an official and, as it were, authentic 
interpretation of an intergovernmental treaty. 
 
COMMENTARY: GC III, supra note 110. 
118. See generally Henckaerts, Twenty-First Century, supra note 108. 
119. See Henckaerts, Response, supra note 38, at 486 (2007) (discussing the contribution 
to IHL from the courts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone). 
120. See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How The International Crimi-
nal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1, 26 (2006) (stating that 
“the laws of war had developed faster since the beginning of the atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia than in the forty-five years after the Nuremburg Tribunals” (citing Theodor 
Meron, Editorial Comment, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 462, 463 (1998))); INT’L HUMAN. L. CLINIC, EMORY U. SCH. OF L., 
OPERATIONAL LAW EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE ON THE GOTOVINA JUDGMENT: MILITARY 
OPERATIONS, BATTLEFIELD REALITY AND THE JUDGMENT’S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVE IM-
PLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 13 
(2012) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414 (noting 
that “[i]ndeed, one of the mandates of the tribunal [ICTY] is the progressive development 
of IHL”). 
121. See Danner, supra note 120, at 25–26 (“During the period of the [International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY)] greatest political weakness, its 
judges issued a surprising series of decisions that effected a fundamental transformation in 
the laws of war.”). 
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threshold of armed conflict, the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflict, and the range of persons protected by the 
Geneva Conventions.122 
As an example, in Prosecutor v. Gotovina, an ICTY Trial Chamber issued a 
1,377-page judgment that included highly controversial conclusions with 
respect to States’ obligations when conducting attacks.123 Based on those 
conclusions, the Chamber convicted two Croatian generals of war crimes 
related to artillery bombardments of urban areas.124 Among other 
questionable findings, it concluded that shell craters located more than 200 
meters from pre-planned military objectives in an urban area proved a 
criminal violation of the IHL principle of distinction.125 The ICTY’s 
Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions and rejected many of the Trial 
Chamber’s characterizations of the principle.126 The judgments set off a 
flurry of exchanges between respected IHL commentators concerning the 
relative merits of the Trial and Appeals Chambers’ judgments.127 States, 
                                                                                                                      
122. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
¶¶ 68–145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (describing both 
when victims become protected persons under Art. 2, and when an internal armed conflict 
reaches the level of international armed conflict through the control of armed forces by a 
foreign power). 
123. See ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120, at 4 (“Precisely because it is the only judgment 
addressing complex operational targeting considerations, the Gotovina case has the poten-
tial to be a great beacon for international law by adding significant definition to the legal 
paradigm that governs such targeting operations . . . . [H]owever, . . . the legal analysis as 
presently conceived is flawed on multiple levels and therefore fails to achieve those 
goals.”); see generally Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Chamber Judg-
ment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011). 
124. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, ¶ 2588. 
125. Id. ¶ 1899. 
126. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 
83–87 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012). 
127. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT 06-90-A, Application and Pro-
posed Amicus Curiae Brief concerning the 15 April 2011 Trial Chamber Judgment and Re-
questing that the Appeals Chamber Reconsider the Findings of Unlawful Artillery Attacks 
During Operation Storm, Conclusion (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 12, 
2012) (“[A]ny judgment that is interpreted as attenuating this symmetry risks undermining 
the efficacy of international humanitarian law and the ultimate humanitarian objectives of 
the law.”); Geoffrey S. Corn & Lt. Col. Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: View-
ing the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337, 
339 (2012) (discussing the effect of Gotovina on the “interrelationship between law and 
military doctrine”); ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120, at 2 (criticizing the “potential flaws in 
the Trial Chamber’s application of IHL; and . . . potential institutional concerns and sec-
ond-order effects resulting from these flaws”). 
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however, were conspicuously absent from this important targeting and 
international criminal law dialogue.128 Even States that frequently 
participate in armed conflict, and that would therefore be specially affected 
by the targeting standards at issue, declined to weigh in officially.129 
This was not always the case. The ICTY’s early IHL work provoked 
meaningful State involvement.130 For example, in 1995 the U.S. 
Department of State filed an amicus curiae brief in the Tribunal’s first case, 
Tadić.131 The brief outlined U.S. legal views on the threshold of armed 
conflict, characterization of armed conflicts as either IAC or NIAC, 
availability of the grave breaches enforcement regime in NIAC, and nature 
and content of the laws and customs of war.132 The brief continues to serve 
as a reliable expression of opinio juris.133 Yet, since its filing, the United 
States has not participated meaningfully and substantively in other war 
crimes cases, nor has it offered a similarly thorough or reasoned reaction to 
a judgment of any international criminal tribunal.134 The reasons for this 
inactivity are unclear, but the growing list of States party to the 
International Criminal Court and that Court’s expanding caseload suggest 
that militarily active States would be well-advised to engage in the 
development of IHL through war crimes tribunals, lest they find 
themselves governed on the battlefield by legal norms developed in 
isolation by jurists. 
The IHL advocacy efforts of NGOs are of similarly worthy note. For 
instance, Human Rights Watch (HRW), one of the most sophisticated of 
                                                                                                                      
128. See generally Corn & Corn, supra note 127; ROUNDTABLE, supra note 120. 
129. E.g., Jamila Trindle, Acquitted in Court, Still Blacklisted by the U.S., FOREIGN POLI-
CY (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/10/acquitted-in-co 
urt-still-blacklisted-by-the-u-s. 
130. See Danner, supra note 120, at 21–22 (noting that the Representative of Venezue-
la issued a report expressing the view that the Tribunal would not be empowered with 
setting the norms of International Law while Canada argued for more specifics in what fell 
under ICTY jurisdiction). 
131. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning 
Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of 
the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic ́ (July 27, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. Tadic ́ Amicus], available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65825.pdf. 
132. See id. at 27–37 (arguing that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over grave breaches, 
violations of customs of war, and crimes against humanity because the alleged offenses did 
occur during an international armed conflict). 
133. See Watts, Reviving Opinio Juris, supra note 27 (observing the brief’s contribution 
to a “more pluralistic, balanced, and active LOAC dialogue”). 
134. Id. 
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NGOs dealing with IHL, regularly issues reports on ongoing or recent 
conflicts.135 The organization also takes strong advocacy positions on IHL-
related matters.136 An example is its 2013 Losing Humanity report, which 
argued, inter alia, that autonomous weapon systems are unlawful per se 
under IHL.137 Although individual scholars protested at such an overbroad 
(and incorrect) statement,138 no State has addressed the various IHL 
matters the organization raised head on.139 Instead, the United States issued 
a Department of Defense Directive that places certain policy limitations on 
the systems without offering meaningful comment on the relevant legal 
issues.140 Such failure to engage the topic cedes control of the legal 
discourse to organizations such as HRW and the chapeau organization in 
the campaign against autonomous systems, Stop Killer Robots.141 
                                                                                                                      
135. E.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, TURNING A BLIND EYE: IMPUNITY FOR LAWS-OF-WAR 
VIOLATIONS DURING THE GAZA WAR (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node 
/89575. 
136. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER 
ROBOTS 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY], available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf (advocating for a ban on fully 
autonomous weapons); HUM. RTS. WATCH, TIME FOR JUSTICE: ENDING IMPUNITY FOR 
KILLINGS AND DISAPPEARANCES IN 1990S TURKEY 61–63 (2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey0912ForUpload.pdf (recommend-
ing further steps the Turkish government needs to take to combat impunity in Turkey). 
137. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 136, at 1. 
138. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous 
Weapon Systems, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 386, 387 (2014) (suggesting prohibiting 
autonomous weapons would be “misguided”); Marco Sassóli, Autonomous Weapons and In-
ternational Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to Be Clarified, 
90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 308, 309–10 (2014) (contending that an autonomous 
weapon can reasonable comply with IHL); Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems: 
A Reply to the Critics, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL FEATURES (Feb. 2013) at 
1–3 (arguing Losing Humanity “obfuscates the on-going legal debate over autonomous 
weapon systems”). 
139. See Matthew Waxman & Kenneth Anderson, Don’t Ban Armed Robots in the U.S., 
NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115229/armed-
robots-banning-autonomous-weapon-systems-isnt-answer (arguing that States should en-
gage in cooperative development of common standards and best practices within a law of 
war framework). 
140. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf 
(setting broad limitations and guidelines regarding the use of autonomous weapons sys-
tems). 
141. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
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United Nations bodies have also entered the fray in various instances, 
including appointments by the Human Rights Council of Special 
Rapporteurs on countering terrorism (Mr. Ben Emmerson) and 
extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (Mr. Christof Heyns).142 
Both have issued reports on drone operations, including IHL issues, 
marked by a high degree of sophistication and normative detail.143 
Although the United States is actively involved in drone operations, it has 
issued no comprehensive statement on the legal questions surrounding 
drone strikes. Instead, the government’s limited comments tend to be 
made, as will be discussed, in speeches by senior government officials at 
academic and professional gatherings or found in internal memoranda not 
intended to be made public.144 
Finally, scholars and other IHL experts have convened and 
collaborated with increasing frequency to produce legal manuals devoted to 
restating customary and treaty IHL, and in many cases clarifying difficulties 
concerning its application and operation.145 Topics covered by these 
manuals include the law of naval warfare, non-international armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
142. See Drone Attacks: UN Experts Express Concern About the Potential Illegal Use of 
Armed Drones, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? 
NewsID=13905 (explaining involvement of Emmerson and Heyns as U.N. Special Rap-
porteurs and noting their roles). The most recent mandates for the Special Rapporteurs 
are, respectively, Human Rights Council Res. 22/8, Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism: Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Coun-
tering Terrorism, 22nd Sess., Mar. 21, 2013, A/HRC/RES/22/8 (Apr. 9, 2013), and Hu-
man Rights Council Res. 26/12, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children, 26th Sess., June 20, 2014, A/HRC/26/L.23 (June 
20, 2014). 
143. Emmerson Report, supra note 13, at 5; Heyns Report, supra note 13, at 8. 
144. E.g., Harold Honhgu Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Ad-
ministration and International Law, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Soci-
ety of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Koh, American Society Remarks], 
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
145. E.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; 
PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., 
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 
(2009) [hereinafter HPCR MANUAL]; NIAC MANUAL; see also PROGRAM ON HUMANITARI-
AN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., COMMENTARY ON THE 
HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 
(2010). 
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law, and the law of air and missile warfare.146 Each is widely cited in legal 
literature and has influenced practice in its respective field.147 And each 
appears to have responded to concerns that participating experts harbored 
regarding the failure of States to provide legal practitioners sufficiently 
granular guidance on troublesome IHL issues.148 Although these manuals 
were not intended to supplant the role of States in IHL interpretation and 
development, they are, to a degree, having exactly that effect. 
In sum, it is clear that States have not kept pace with an ever-increasing 
flow of non-State international legal commentary; the volume and 
frequency of the latter drowns out what little comment and reaction States 
have offered. It is no exaggeration to say that jurists, NGOs, scholars and 
other non-State actors presently have greater influence on the 
interpretation and development of IHL than do States. The roles of the 
respective communities have, unfortunately, been reversed—the pluralistic 
process of formation and development that has long guaranteed the 
efficacy and relevance of IHL is in peril. 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF STATES 
 
Notwithstanding their recent reserve with respect to opinio juris, States and 
their legal agents still enjoy unique relevance in the formation and 
interpretation of international law generally and IHL in particular. As the 
primary authors and subjects of IHL, States have authority to actively 
shape its content and direction, through both direct means, such as treaty 
formation and State practice, and indirect means, such as positions 
proffered in litigation, legal publications, public statements of legal intent, 
and diplomatic communications resorting to law.149 
                                                                                                                      
146. See generally HPCR MANUAL, supra note 145; NIAC MANUAL supra note 57; SAN 
REMO MANUAL supra note 145. 
147. See, e.g., Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Current State of the Law of Naval War-
fare: A Fresh Look at the San Remo Manual, 82 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 269, 269 
(2006) (analyzing the influence of the San Remo Manual on current policies and addressing 
the manual’s shortcomings); see also Symposium: The 2009 Air and Missile Warfare Manual: A 
Critical Analysis, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 261, 261–79 (2012) (discussing 
in detail the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare). 
148. HPCR MANUAL supra note 145, foreword; NIAC MANUAL supra note 57, preface; 
SAN REMO MANUAL supra note 145, introductory note. 
149. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 26 (“[Custom may be] evidenced by such in-
ternal matters as [States’] domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, 
internal government memoranda, and ministerial statements in Parliaments and else-
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Even as scholars challenge State-centric understandings of international 
law, near universal respect endures for the special role of sovereigns in the 
formation of international law.150 To co-opt and modify a common 
observation with respect to Originalism in American constitutional 
interpretation, everyone is a sovereigntist sometimes.151 What distinguishes 
dyed-in-the-wool international law sovereigntists from non-sovereigntists is 
probably not acceptance of the legitimacy of State input, but rather 
attitudes toward non-State actors’ international legal contributions. Few 
international lawyers contest that State expressions of opinio juris constitute 
legitimate sources of law and a principled form of international legal 
interpretation.152 Disagreements seem instead to concern the effect that 
absence of State opinio juris has on an international norm.153 And while there 
is surely value in the balanced pluralism that results from having both State 
and non-State contributions to the interpretation and development of 
international law, State input has always been singularly significant, 
particularly when armed conflict is the issue.154 State opinio juris remains the 
critical bellwether for the degree of consensus, acceptance, and therefore 
effectiveness and legitimacy of any international legal rule. 
In addition to formal authority, States possess unique competency, 
facility, and access with respect to the contextual ingredients of 
international law.155 IHL is illustrative. Many commentators grasp the harsh 
                                                                                                                      
where.”). 
150. See, e.g., Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Para-
digm for International Law?, 4 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 447, 448 
(1993) (mentioning the importance of State structure in the future development of inter-
national law while prognosticating the end of a traditional model of sovereignty for 
States). 
151. David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, The RECORD ONLINE (ALUMNI MAGA-
ZINE) (Fall 2010), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss (“[A]s a 
matter of rhetoric, everyone is an originalist sometimes . . . .”). 
152. See Eric Engle, U.N. Packing the State’s Reputation? A Response to Professor Brewster’s 
“Unpacking the State’s Reputation”, 114 PENNSYLVANIA STATE LAW REVIEW PENN STATIM 
34, 37 (2010) (operating under the assumption that international law is enforced by States). 
153. See Ross E. Schreiber, Ascertaining Opinio Juris of States Concerning Norms Involving 
the Prevention of International Terrorism: A Focus on U.N. Process, 16 BOSTON UNIVERSITY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 309, 312 (1998) (detailing the difficult task of deducing opin-
io juris). 
154. See id. (detailing the particular confusions that arise when trying to deduce inter-
national norms without State opinio juris, particularly in armed, nuclear conflict). 
155. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 
85 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 101, 110 (2010) (bolstering an argument by stating that 
international law relies on a State’s domestic laws and that a State actor’s courts applying 
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consequences of armed conflict.156 Yet, few outside the ambit of States’ 
defense ministries and armed forces fully appreciate the operational 
challenges, demands, and limitations of combat so essential to fairly 
striking the delicate balance between military necessity and humanity that 
infuses IHL and informs its interpretation and evolution.157 Even 
commentators with a military or military legal background can find that 
their IHL experiential base has become dated or passé.158 There is truly no 
adequate substitute for the active input of IHL professionals immersed in 
States’ current operations and legal deliberation. 
The dearth of contextual IHL custom and States’ viewpoints is often 
unavoidable. States frequently shield their battlefield conduct and decision 
making from public view for rational operational reasons.159 And although 
they may acquire information concerning the practices of adversaries and 
other States by employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) assets, that information is typically classified and therefore 
unavailable to non-State actors. States do regularly share some classified 
information amongst themselves, the paradigmatic examples being “five-
eyes” sharing160 and the sharing of classified material among NATO 
allies,161 but, because release would reveal certain “sources and methods” of 
collection, non-State actors seldom see such material, for better or worse, 
except when it is leaked.162 The practical effect of this restricted 
                                                                                                                      
the State’s own law is “normatively superior”). 
156. See, e.g., Ariel Zemach, Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities 
Within an Occupied Territory, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 
645, 646–47 (describing the human costs of war in Iraq and the Gaza Strip). 
157. See id. at 675–76 (assessing the intricacies present in balancing human rights with 
the demands of wartime). 
158. See Olivier Bangerter, Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Hu-
manitarian Law or Not, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 353, 370 (2011) 
(“[I]t is questionable how far knowledge of the content of IHL by many commanders and 
fighters really extends beyond some basic notions.”). 
159. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 77, 88–91 (2010) (discussing frequency and challenges of 
State military secrets). 
160. See Paul Farrell, History of 5-Eyes–Explainer, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013), http: 
//www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/history-of-5-eyes-explainer (delineating the 
history of the five-eyes partnership, involving intelligence sharing between the U.S., U.K., 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 
161. See generally Alasdair Roberts, Entangling Allies: NATO’s Security of Information Policy 
and the Entrenchment of State Secrets, 36 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 329 
(2003). 
162. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher 
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informational environment is to stymy non-State efforts to discern State 
practices, thereby rendering the former’s input to the IHL interpretation 
and development process, through no fault of their own, somewhat 
suspect. 
Additionally, the reluctance of States to express opinio juris on particular 
topics of international law is in some senses understandable. A number of 
considerations recommend the increasingly prevalent wait-and-see 
approach. A State may conclude that too little is known about the 
implications of an emerging area of warfare to commit to any particular 
international regulatory doctrine or regime or to admit publicly to the 
existence of international norms bearing on the matter at all. It is also 
possible that State reticence is less the product of calculated caution rather 
than political impasse deriving from domestic political considerations. In 
many municipal legal systems, constitutional and statutory arrangements 
spread authority over international law matters among several agencies and 
even branches of government, frustrating coordination and consensus.163 
Interagency friction or disagreement may prevent government-level 
consensus, especially with respect to new or emerging legal debates. 
Absence of expressed State opinio juris may even be explained as 
evidence of opinio juris itself.164 In such a case, the State may intend its 
silence as an implied expression of the view that no relevant IHL norm 
exists.165 Restated, although a State may undertake a continuous course of 
practice on the battlefield, that same State may assiduously refrain from 
accompanying expressions of opinio juris so as to preclude any purported 
crystallization of a customary norm. This might be the case, for example, 
when it imposes self-defense limits on the use of force in rules of 
                                                                                                                      
Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1201, 1216–18, 
1236 (2011) (detailing the relationship between the government’s interest in preventing 
disclosure of sources and methods and the public’s interest especially in the judicial con-
text). 
163. For example, the U.S. Constitution vests authority over international law to each 
of the branches of the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (enumerating 
the U.S. Congress’s power to “define and punish offenses against the law of Nations”); id. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring Senate advice and consent for treaty ratification); id. (enumerat-
ing the U.S. President’s power “to make Treaties”); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending the 
judicial power to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under . . . Treaties”). 
164. But see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 437 (2006) (“It is impossible to make any pre-
sumptions about the opinio juris on the basis of such silence as a matter of general rule.”). 
165. Contra id. 
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engagement in situations in which status-based targeting is lawful or when 
it affords treatment to detainees in excess of what IHL would otherwise 
require. 
On balance, however, the various rationales for State restraint on 
matters of opinio juris are overrated. State silence has not proved effective at 
stemming IHL’s development, which appears to occur with or without 
active State involvement.166 Plainly, the failure of States to produce or 
interpret specific rules of conduct for emerging areas of warfare has not 
counseled silence on the part of non-State legal actors.167 They have 
aggressively stepped in to cultivate IHL in response to the vacuum left by 
States.168 Rather than preserve operational and legal flexibility, State silence 
may simply cede significant initiative and power over IHL to non-State 
actors. 
Two international legal controversies demonstrate how State delay, 
ambiguity, or silence with respect to opinio juris risks the imposition of very 
real costs. Soon after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the United States launched military operations in Afghanistan “in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States.”169 U.S. armed forces soon captured individuals believed to be 
affiliated with al Qaeda or organizations that were said to have supported 
or harbored al Qaeda, such as Afghanistan’s de facto Taliban 
government.170 By early 2002, U.S. armed forces and intelligence agencies 
had transferred over 150 suspected high-level leaders or valuable fighters to 
the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.171 
Questions concerning the legal status of the Guantanamo detainees 
quickly arose.172 Some speculated the detainees might qualify as prisoners 
                                                                                                                      
166. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY supra note 38, xlv–xlvi (stating that a State omis-
sion or abstention may be construed to support opinion juris). 
167. See supra Section III. 
168. Id. 
169. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)). 
170. See 1 CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY, LEGAL LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOLUME I: MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11 
SEPTEMBER 2001–1 MAY 2003), at 53 (2004) (describing legal issues concerning enemy 
personnel detained in Afghanistan in late 2001). 
171. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Troops Arrive at Base in Cuba to Build Jails, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/07/us/a-nation-challenged-the-
prisoners-troops-arrive-at-base-in-cuba-to-build-jails.html (detailing the number of prison-
ers present in Cuba in 2002 as over 300). 
172. Bryan Bender, Red Cross Disputes US Stance on Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 
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of war, entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention of 
1949.173 Others contended that both al-Qaeda and Taliban members were 
extra-legal persons and unlawful combatants, entitled to no specific 
international legal protections.174 The U.S. government did little to quell or 
resolve debate.175 Its public position on the matter was vague, especially as 
to the underlying legal reasoning upon which its actions were purportedly 
based.176 
This is not to say the government had ignored the issue of the 
detainees’ international legal status. As public and political debate swirled, a 
parallel, albeit cloistered, legal debate took place within and between several 
U.S. executive branch agencies.177 The various positions broadly emulated 
those that had surfaced in public debate within the broader legal 
community.178 However, at the time, the government neither publically 
proffered a comprehensively-reasoned legal analysis of its detention policy, 
nor provided any clear statement setting forth its views on U.S. legal 
obligations regarding the Guantanamo detainees’ status and treatment.179 
In early 2002, President Bush ultimately settled the internal executive 
branch debate on the detainees’ legal status.180 However, the full legal bases 
                                                                                                                      
2002, at Al; Agency Differs with U.S. over P.O.W.’s, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 9, 2002), http:/ 
/www.nytimes.com/2002/02/09/international/09DETA.html . 
173. Bender, supra note 172, at A1. 
174. E.g., Sean D. Murphy, Decision Not to Regard Persons Detained in Afghanistan as 
POWs, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 475, 476–77 (2002). 
175. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in A Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1001, 1030–34 (2004) (describing the ways in which the Bush Administration ap-
proached handling the legal status of terrorists captured and detained post-9/11). 
176. Id. 
177. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]. The Pa-
pers are a compilation of dozens of U.S. government legal memoranda and investigations 
related to detainee policies in the Global War on Terrorism. See generally id. 
178. Id. 
179. See Murphy, supra note 174, at 477 (describing the Bush administration’s chang-
ing stance on the status and treatment of Guantanamo detainees under the Geneva Con-
vention). 
180. Memorandum from President George W. Bush for Vice President, et al., Hu-
mane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Memo. 
from President Bush], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_ 
memo_20020207_ed.pdf; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit 
Taliban Captives, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 8, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/0 
8/world/nation-challenged-captives-shift-bush-says-geneva-rules-fit-taliban-captives.html 
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for the government’s ultimate position remained classified.181 The Bush 
administration appeared satisfied to justify its determinations of the 
detainees’ legal status with short summary fact sheets.182 In fact, the full 
legal reasoning analyzing the detainees’ status was never made public 
through any officially approved expression of opinio juris—it was instead 
leaked.183 As the unauthorized release of photos depicting prisoner abuse at 
the Abu Ghraib military detention facility in Iraq took place in April 
2004,184 news outlets also began to receive and publish leaked copies of 
executive branch legal documents and memoranda addressing the 
Guantanamo detainees’ legal status and the justifications for their indefinite 
detention.185 The leaked memoranda fueled intense debate, litigation, and 
resentment, both in the United States and abroad.186 They also inspired 
international lawyers to aggressively rebut the legal reasoning contained 
therein.187 The U.S. executive branch quickly lost the initiative regarding 
characterization of the detainees’ status under IHL to the judicial branch, 
Congress, and even the non-State international law community. 
To be sure, not all of the negative fallout of the affair is attributable to 
absence of effective opinio juris. Substantive deficiencies in the legal analyses 
of the memoranda supporting the policies are chiefly to blame.188 The 
marginalization of seasoned professional legal expertise within the 
                                                                                                                      
(reporting that the decision to apply of the Geneva Convention to Taliban captives ended 
an “internal legal debate”). 
181. A Guide to the Memos on Torture, NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref 
/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
182. Fact Sheet, White House Press Office, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 
7, 2002), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=79402; see also, Press Re-
lease, Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 
2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 
(demonstrating Secretary Rumsfeld’s failure to expand on the Administration’s reasoning 
when questioned). 
183. Memo. from President Bush, supra note 180. 
184. See Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004), 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib 
(breaking the story of prisoner abuse by military personnel). 
185. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 177. 
186. See, e.g., Arthur H. Garrison, The Bush Administration and The Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) Torture Memos: A Content Analysis of the Response in the Academic Legal Community, 11 
CARDOZO PUBLIC LAW, POLICY AND ETHICS JOURNAL 1, 11–12, 6–26 (2012) (discussing 
the academic community’s moral indignation). 
187. Id. at 6. 
188. Id. at 6–7. 
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executive branch likewise contributed.189 Yet, a more vigorous and public 
approach to opinio juris could have prevented much of the costly fallout. If 
U.S. executive branch officials felt it necessary to abandon long-settled 
principles with respect to the classification and treatment of persons 
detained in armed conflict, an active and public campaign of timely and 
tightly-reasoned opinio juris would surely have been a more effective way to 
develop international norms better suited to the modern security needs of 
States than secretive, unilaterally constructed memoranda. If the laws-of-
war were indeed “quaint” and “obsolete” in some respects,190 a carefully 
managed campaign of opinio juris that marshaled the full expertise and 
resources of the U.S. government’s legal community would surely have 
proved more successful in updating them in both the long and short term. 
The expanding use of drones to target terrorists outside active theaters 
of combat operations is a second instance where the United States appears 
to prefer to operate under a shroud of legal ambiguity.191 These operations 
raise questions from an array of legal regimes—the jus ad bellum, 
sovereignty, human rights, and IHL.192 With respect to IHL, the core issues 
are 1) whether the drone operations are being mounted as an aspect of an 
“armed conflict” such that IHL applies and, if so, 2) whether the 
individuals attacked qualify as lawful targets, and 3) whether the operations 
                                                                                                                      
189. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Paul E. Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, Hostile Protected Persons or 
“Extra-Conventional Persons”: How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordi-
nary Challenges for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 681, 682–83 (2005) (discussing the role of judge advocates in giving legal advice 
to the ranking commander in Iraq at the time of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuses). 
190. Draft Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George 
W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, 
supra note 177, at 118. 
191. CIVILIAN COST, supra note 56, at 80–81. 
192. Id. at 26, 80–83; Rotem Giladi, The Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello Distinction and the 
Law of Occupation, 41 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 246, 246–47 (2008) (“Every . . . practitioner of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) is familiar with the distinction between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello (or IHL). Both are public international law regimes that regulate war but 
whereas the former regulates the legality of the use of force per se, the latter concerns the 
legality of the manner in which force is used. The distinction generally means that the rules 
of jus in bello apply irrespective of questions of legality under jus ad bellum and that, as a 
consequence, all belligerents are subject to the same rules of jus in bello, whatever their po-
sition under jus ad bellum.”). 
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comply with IHL rule of proportionality and the requirement to take 
precautions in attack.193 
There is no question that the admixture of normative regimes renders 
linear and compartmentalized legal analysis of the drone program 
challenging.194 Indeed, much of the discussion to date has misstated the law 
and conflated separate and distinct legal regimes.195 It is a discourse that has 
been marked by emotive assertions as much as by legal acumen.196 
However, non-State actors have lately started to produce analyses that are 
sophisticated and convincing.197 Noteworthy in this regard are recent 
reports by HRW, Amnesty International, and the two U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs, all of which, appropriately so, have garnered significant 
attention in the international law community.198 
Yet to date, the government, under two very different administrations, 
has offered no thorough expression of opinio juris that draws together the 
various legal strands in a manner that would convincingly justify the strikes 
as a matter of international law.199 Instead, both administrations have 
resorted to periodic speeches by senior officials who provide only vague 
glimpses of the U.S. position.200 
Most often cited is a speech by former Department of State Legal 
Adviser Harold Koh at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Society 
                                                                                                                      
193. AP I, supra note 55, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); 1 CUSTOMARY IHL 
STUDY, supra note 38, r. 14–24. 
194. See generally Michael Schmitt, Narrowing the International Law Divide: The Drone De-
bate Matures, 39 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter 
Schmitt, Drone Debate]. 
195. Id. at 3–9. 
196. Id. 
197. See id. at 12–13 (describing analysis and comparison of prominent recent re-
ports). 
198. See generally Emmerson Report, supra note 13; Heyns Report, supra note 13; CIVILIAN 
COST, supra note 56; AMNESTY INT’L, “WILL I BE NEXT?”: US DRONE STRIKES IN PAKI-
STAN (2013) [hereinafter DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN]. For an analysis of the four re-
ports, see generally Schmitt, Drone Debate, supra note 194. 
199. See, e.g., DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, supra note 198, at 49 (describing the re-
fusal of the United States to provide public access to information about its drone program 
in Pakistan). 
200. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the 
London School of Economics: Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006) 
[hereinafter Bellinger, War on Terrorism], available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2006/ 
98861.htm (describing the U.S. views on the detention and treatment of terrorists since 
9/11). 
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of International Law.201 Although heralded at the time as the first full 
explanation of U.S. legal policy on drone strikes, for experts in the field it 
was a rather confusing explication.202 For instance, it was unclear whether 
the use of force against members of al Qaeda was being justified on the 
basis of the law of self-defense (a jus ad bellum issue), because of U.S. 
involvement in an armed conflict with the organization (an IHL issue), or 
on account of both.203 The speech was likewise unexceptional. An 
announcement that the United States complies with the principle of 
distinction and the rule of proportionality hardly constitutes an epiphany.204 
Failure to comply would not only violate IHL, but also amount to a war 
crime by those involved.205 And curiously, there is no mention of the 
requirement to take precautions in attack, which is central to the legality of 
drone strikes under IHL.206 
Other noteworthy speeches include those by Koh’s predecessor, John 
Bellinger, at the London School of Economics;207 John Brennan at Harvard 
Law School while he was serving as the President’s Assistant for 
Counterterrorism;208 Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern 
University School of Law;209 former Defense Department General Counsel 
                                                                                                                      
201. Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144. 
202. See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUM. RTS. INST., TARGETING OPERATIONS WITH 
DRONE TECHNOLOGY: HUMANITARIAN LAW IMPLICATIONS 2 (2011) (discussing former 
Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s explanation of U.S. legal policy on drone 
strikes and the legality of U.S. practice). 
203. Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7. Adviser Harold Koh stat-
ed, “[a]s I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed 
conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the 
horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense 
under international law.” Id. 
204. Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7–8. 
205. See 1 CUSTOMARY IHL STUDY, supra note 38, r. 1, 14, 156 (discussing the princi-
ple of distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality in attack, and defini-
tion of war crimes, respectively). 
206. See generally Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (lacking discussion 
of drone precautionary measures); see also ICRC Challenges, supra note 35, at 38–39 (discuss-
ing required precautions under IHL and its application to drone attacks). 
207. Bellinger, War on Terrorism, supra note 200. 
208. John O. Brennan, Asst. to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, Remarks at the Pro-
gram on Law and Security at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http:/ 
/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthen 
ing-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. 
209. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at Northwestern University School of 
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Jeh Johnson at Yale Law School;210 and the President himself at National 
Defense University.211 A brief Fact Sheet was released by the White House 
contemporaneously with the President’s speech.212 Each of these addressed 
particular aspects of IHL and other bodies of law governing drone 
operations, but none offered an analysis robust enough to draw any but the 
broadest of conclusions as to the U.S. view of the applicable law.213 
Moreover, the speeches not only failed to clearly distinguish the various 
legal regimes from which the relevant law derives, but left it uncertain 
whether the positions taken were the product of legal, operational, moral, 
or policy concerns. Paradoxically, the most comprehensive analysis by the 
government of the international law issues surrounding drone operations 
was that offered in an unsigned and undated draft Justice Department 
White Paper that was leaked to the press in 2013, hardly an exemplar of 
reliable opinio juris.214 
The vacuity of recent opinio juris is particularly surprising given the fact 
that the law of drone operations is exceedingly emotive and has 
underpinned widespread and impassioned condemnation of the United 
States as a “might makes right” State.215 As a matter of law, the basis for 
the U.S. operations is arguably sound.216 Articulating that basis publicly 
would not only have the immediate effect of tempering the criticism (much 
                                                                                                                      
Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-
speech-1203051.html. 
210. Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, 
Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Address at the Dean’s Lecture at 
Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 2012), in 31 YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 141 (2012). 
211. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/r 
emarks-president-national-defense-university. 
212. Fact Sheet: The President’s May 23 Speech on Counterterrorism, White House 
Press Office (May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/ 
fact-sheet-president-s-may-23-speech-counterterrorism. 
213. See generally id.; Bellinger, War on Terrorism, supra note 200; Brennan, supra note 
208; Holder, supra note 209; Johnson, supra note 210; Obama, supra note 211. 
214. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated 
Force (Leaked Draft White Paper Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn 
.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
215. See generally CIVILIAN COST, supra note 56 (detailing the civilian casualties of U.S. 
drone policy and recommending changes). 
216. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the 
Logic of International Law, 52 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 77 (2013). 
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of which is levied on the basis of a lack of legal transparency217), but also 
help preserve the option of conducting drone operations extraterritorially 
in the future. 
Whatever the reason for the U.S. failure to issue an unambiguous 
expression of opinio juris, by now the United States and other countries that 
conduct such operations have lost control of the debate. Non-State actors 
are shaping the discussion as they wish, with States merely responding, or 
more often not responding at all, to the sundry objections they raise.218 
From this reactive stance, it is nearly impossible for States conducting 
drone strikes to muster sufficient support from other States to redirect the 
debate. The domestic political costs of supporting the strikes (at least those 
outside an active battlefield) are simply too high for them.219 Additionally, 
the United States has not provided an adequately detailed and reasoned 
delineation of its legal position that could be assessed and embraced by 
other States.220 To employ military terminology, the drone debate and many 
other currently debated IHL issues are, for the United States especially, 
“self-inflicted wounds.” 
Perhaps the most pressing need for an expression of opinio juris is with 
respect to those articles of AP I the United States believes accurately reflect 
customary law—and those it does not. The instrument was designed to 
supplement the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which dealt primarily with 
                                                                                                                      
217. See, e.g., Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to President Barack 
Obama (Dec. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Letter to President Obama], available at 
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2013-12-04-Coalition-Follow-Up-
Letter-to-Obama-on-TK.pdf (calling on the government to “publicly disclose key targeted 
killing standards and criteria”); MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 65: REFORMING U.S. DRONE STRIKE POLICIES 3 (2013) 
(stating that the “lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks 
proliferation of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework”); 
Heyns Report, supra note 13, at 21 (emphasizing to the U.N. the need for greater transparen-
cy regarding drone policy for all States). 
218. See, e.g., Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144, at 7–8 (responding to 
criticisms against U.S. targeting practices); Letter to President Obama, supra note 217 (not-
ing President Obama’s stated intention to limit the use of lethal force). 
219. See ANTHONY DWORKIN, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
DRONES AND TARGETED KILLING: DEFINING A EUROPEAN POSITION 2–4 (2013) (dis-
cussing domestic opposition to drone strikes among E.U. member States). 
220. See Letter to President Obama, supra note 217 (asking for a clearer standard for 
drone strikes); ZENKO, supra note 217, at 16–17 (noting that the United States has offered 
multiple legal justifications for drone strikes). 
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protections for specified persons and objects.221 Rules regarding how 
combat was to occur were the province of the 1907 Regulations annexed to 
Hague Convention IV.222 Although a post-World War II tribunal at 
Nuremberg found that it reflected customary law,223 the treaty was sparse 
and clearly in need of expansion in the aftermath of two world wars and 
numerous post-World War II conflicts such as those in Algeria and 
Vietnam.224 AP I, addressed to international armed conflict, was intended 
to serve that process.225 In the ensuing two and a half decades, the United 
States has remained a non-Party.226 Still, 174 States are Party to the 
Protocol, including most NATO allies and States with which the United 
States frequently operates militarily, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia.227 
To date, the United States has issued no comprehensive expression of 
opinio juris regarding those provisions of AP I it regards as reflecting 
customary international law.228 Although it is clear from U.S. practice, 
training, and doctrine that certain key provisions, such as the 
proportionality aspects of Articles 51 and 57, are accepted as customary,229 
little is known beyond that. For instance, does the United States accept the 
definition of perfidy only with the exclusion of the reference to “capture,” 
                                                                                                                      
221. AP I, supra note 55, art. 1(3). 
222. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. 
223. United States v. von Leeb et al. [High Command Trial], 11 TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL 
LAW NO. 10, at 532 (1950). 
224. See George Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 764, 764 (1981) (noting that the Additional Protocols were created to 
address the deficiencies in the Geneva Conventions). 
225. Id. 
226. Treaties and States Party to Such Treaties: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
8 June 1977, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates= 
XPages_NORMStatesParties &xp_treatySelected=470 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter ICRC Additional Protocol Parties]. 
227. Id. 
228. See generally Theodor Meron et al., Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the Ge-
neva Conventions for Protection of War Victims: Future Directions in Light of the U.S. Decision Not to 
Ratify, Panel Discussion, in 81 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 
26 (1987). 
229. Cf. Koh, American Society Remarks, supra note 144 (discussing the rigorous im-
plementation of proportionality and distinction throughout the planning and execution of 
lethal operations in the Obama Administration). 
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as is sometimes asserted?230 Does it continue to take the position that the 
provisions on the environment do not reflect customary law? Is the U.S. 
position on military objectives that “war-sustaining” objects are included, 
as appears to be the case from the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard 
manual, but which has been criticized as a distortion of the law?231 What is 
the current U.S. position regarding combatant status for those members of 
a militia group belonging to a Party to the conflict, but who do not wear 
distinguishing attire or symbols when conducting an attack?232 
When trying to discern the U.S. legal position with respect to these and 
other unsettled issues, scholars and practitioners turn to three sources. The 
first two are internal Department of Defense memoranda, one to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,233 the other to an Assistant General 
Counsel.234 Both cover the same ground and are distinguished by their 
brevity and restatement of the obvious.235 The third is a speech by the then 
Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department at an academic conference 
in 1987 that was reprinted in the American University Journal of International 
Law and Policy.236 To provide guidance to its judge advocates, the U.S. Army 
has reprinted the second memorandum and a summary of the article in its 
current 2014 Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement.237 
                                                                                                                      
230. See AP I, supra note 55, art. 37 (stating the prohibition of perfidy elements). 
231. NWP 1-14M, supra note 55, ¶ 8.2; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOS-
TILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 95–96 (2d ed. 2010). 
232. See AP I, supra note 55, art. 44 (reciting the rule under the Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions). 
233. Memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Protocols I and 
II–Humanitarian Law during Armed Conflict, Office of the Ass’t Sec’y of Def., (Nov. 7, 
1977) [hereinafter Memorandum to the Chairman] (on file with author). 
234. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks et al. to Mr. John H. McNeill, Ass’t Gen. 
Counsel, Office of the Sec’y of Def. (May 9, 1986), in U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 
234–35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum to John H. McNeil]. 
235. Compare Memorandum to the Chairman, supra note 233, with Memorandum to 
John H. McNeil, supra note 234, at 234–35 (listing the provisions of the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions that were already part of customary international 
law). 
236. Matheson, supra note 67; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Remarks on the Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements 
(Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLICY 460, 467–68 (1987) (discussing why the Joint Chiefs of Staff found AP I to be 
“militarily unacceptable”). 
237. U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 232–35 (William J. Johnson ed., 2014). 
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This lack of opinio juris is problematic. U.S. forces have been at war over 
a decade with little official guidance as to those aspects of AP I, the most 
comprehensive conduct of hostilities treaty, the United States believes are 
customary in nature.238 Moreover, in both of its major conflicts, U.S. troops 
operated alongside forces subject to the Protocol and in many cases 
commanded those troops in combat, thereby raising important questions 
of legal interoperability.239 
Finally, especially illustrative of the U.S. reluctance to set forth its IHL 
positions openly is the tortured process to produce a Department of 
Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual.240 Although military manuals are not 
themselves expressions of opinio juris because they are often based in part 
on operational and policy concerns, they serve as useful evidence thereof.241 
Presently, the Army Manual dates from 1956,242 the Navy/Marine Corps/
Coast Guard Manual is a 2007 product,243 and the Air Force no longer has 
a manual in force.244 In 1996, the Army Judge Advocate General’s sensible 
                                                                                                                      
238. See Cadwalader, supra note 65, at 135 (“Unfortunately, there is no single authori-
tative reference detailing those provisions of AP I the US accepts as an accurate restate-
ment of customary international law or other legal obligations, or that it follows as a mat-
ter of policy during armed conflict.”). 
239. The U.S. has not ratified AP I, but many States that have assisted the U.S. in 
armed conflicts over the past decade have ratified AP I. ICRC Additional Protocol Parties, 
supra note 226. 
240. See W. Hays Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, Address before 
the American Bar Association Standing Committee on National Security, at 6 (Nov. 30 
2012) [hereinafter Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual], available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Parks.Manual.pdf (detailing 
the failure of the 2010 draft of the manual); Robert Chesney, Hays Parks on the Demise of the 
DOD War Manual, LAWFARE (Dec. 8 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/hays-
parks-on-the-demise-of-the-dod-law-of-war-manual/ (“The effort to publish that manual 
now appears to be dead in the water, for better or worse, and the speech Hays gave at last 
week’s meeting is something of a post-mortem providing his view as to why things 
stalled.”); Edwin Williamson & Hays Parks, Where is the Law of War Manual?, 18 WEEKLY. 
STANDARD (July 22, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/where-law-war-
manual_739267.html?nopager=1 (discussing both the fourteen year process of drafting 
the manual as well as the sudden thirty month delay in approving the manual); Cadwala-
der, supra note 65, at 156 (stating that “the author of this paper has been informed that the 
Manual remains under review and its release date is uncertain”). 
241. See Cadwalader, supra note 65, at 160–68 (interpreting AP I in light of the Army 
Field Manual and the Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual). 
242. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 
(1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. 
243. See generally NWP 1-14M, supra note 55. 
244. The Air Force manual has been rescinded. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE 
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proposal that a manual be produced for all four DoD services was 
accepted.245 It took nearly a decade and a half to produce a draft,246 a 
particularly unfortunate pace given that two major wars replete with 
extraordinarily complex legal issues were underway for much of the period. 
Acceptance of the draft appears to have become the victim of interagency 
disagreement.247 
As a result, the Army operates armed with a manual that is 58 years old 
and the Air Force “flies and fights” without any comprehensive published 
legal guidance.248 In the absence of formal guidance, U.S. forces are 
sometimes forced to train, operate, and render legal advice based on 
documents issued by non-State actors, including some of those mentioned 
supra.249 The situation is regrettable not only for its failure to support 
serving military lawyers and commanders, but also as yet another example 
of U.S. retreat from active IHL opinio juris. 
Clearly, the absence of authoritative State opinio juris impoverishes IHL 
discussions, debates, and deliberations, both descriptive and normative. 
Whatever one’s opinion of the substantive quality or correctness of a 
State’s particular expression of opinio juris, State legal opinions provide 
indispensable control samples for meaningful analysis and critique. The 
efforts of, inter alia, legal practitioners, judges, government legal advisers, 
scholars, commanders, humanitarian workers, members of the media, and 
policy makers inexorably suffer when States fail to clarify and update their 
views on the content, interpretation, and future direction of IHL. 
                                                                                                                      
ADVOCATE GEN., AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-34, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1980). 
245. Williamson & Parks, supra note 240. 
246. See id. (remarking that the Department of Defense (DoD) working group spent 
fourteen years to produce the first draft of the manual). 
247. See id. (explaining major policy disagreements among Departments of State, Jus-
tice, and Defense); see also Parks, Update on the DOD Law of War Manual, supra note 240 
(indicating consensus of the agencies involved after the first draft of the manual was pro-
duced in 2010 has since ended). But see Letter from Robert S. Taylor, Acting General 
Counsel, Dep’t of Def. to Editor of The Weekly Standard (July 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Letter-to-The-Weekly-Stan 
dard_18Jul2013.pdf (responding to the Williamson and Parks article supra note 240 and 
emphasizing that experts are still working cooperatively and diligently to produce the final 
version of the manual). 
248. See FM 27-10, supra note 242 (dating from July 1956); see DEP’T OF THE AIR 
FORCE, supra note 244 (noting the Army Manual was written in 1956 and the Air Force 
manual has been rescinded). 
249. E.g., Emmerson Report, supra note 13. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
This has been an article about process, not substance. It is meant to be 
neither polemical nor Manichean. It offers no comment on any position 
that has been asserted by non-State actors or States with respect to the 
interpretation of extant IHL or its apparent evolutionary vector. Instead, 
we simply lament the fact that States, perhaps without even realizing they 
have been doing so, are ceding control over the content, interpretation, and 
development of IHL to others. Greater sensitivity on the part of States to 
the centrality of expressing opinio juris to law formation and interpretation 
appears merited. 
The reluctance of States and their legal representatives to communicate 
and commit to clear views on IHL matters vitiates legal discourse, 
degrading the functioning and development of a critical aspect of the 
international legal system. Scholars, commentators, advocates, judges, and 
even States’ own diplomats and legal advisors are by now accustomed to 
resorting to speculation to resolve ambiguity concerning any number of 
State views on IHL. Paradoxically, in the absence of State views, such 
speculation can become, over time, the law. Unless the trend is reversed, 
States stand in peril of losing sway over debates that may significantly and 
adversely impact their freedom of action on the battlefield, or even place 
their civilian population at increased risk. 
In our view, a number of important and emerging legal issues related to 
armed conflict, such as cyber operations, are now ripe for expressions of 
opinio juris by States, including the United States. This should be 
unsurprising since the existing IHL principle or rules, treaty or customary, 
were crafted or crystallized before the issues ripened. Accordingly, State 
expressions of opinio juris take on added importance as new technologies 
and methods of warfare are developed and fielded. 
The question is, of course, whether the unfortunate tendency of States 
to shy away from expressions of opinio juris will continue to plague IHL? It 
is a question of seminal importance in light of new forms and means of 
warfare. Of these, the emergence of cyberspace as a pervasive aspect of 
conflict250 presents the most pressing demand for opinio juris. Indeed, States’ 
                                                                                                                      
250. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 2–4 
(J2011) [hereinafter STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE], available at http:/ 
/www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf (describing various threats and potential 
vulnerabilities posed by malicious cyber attacks that could affect military, public, and pri-
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armed forces have been quick to embrace cyberspace as a domain of 
military operations.251 Yet, States will be assuming grave risks if the trend of 
refraining from offering clear expressions of opinio juris regarding IHL 
endures. This is especially so with respect to cyber operations because such 
operations are typically classified. Thus, there will often be no visible State 
practice from which to draw even inferences of opinio juris. As non-State 
actors engage in activities that take the place of State expressions of opinio 
juris in the development and interpretation of IHL cyber norms, they may 
well be operating on partial or faulty information as to actual State practice. 
Whether to announce doctrinal details and clarifications, preserve 
flexibility through confirmation of ambiguity, or simply reject or confirm 
the existence of particular norms, such expressions of opinio juris manage 
important State legal and operational interests. Therefore, State legal 
agencies and agents, particularly Ministries and Departments of Defense, 
must be equipped, organized, and empowered to participate actively in the 
interpretation and development of IHL. States, and specially affected States 
in particular, must make responses to emerging IHL scholarship, 
investigations and jurisprudence a regular facet of their opinio juris. 
Reinvigorating opinio juris would do more than satisfy international law 
sovereigntists. It would foster the restoration of the pluralistic IHL 
dialogue that formerly tested, updated, and enriched the balance between 
military necessity and humanitarian considerations that necessarily 
underpins IHL. 
                                                                                                                      
vate interests); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3–13, INFORMATION OPER-
ATIONS vii (2012) [hereinafter INFORMATION OPERATIONS], available at http://www.dtic 
.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf (“The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are 
equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use information-related 
capabilities . . . to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use 
more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environ-
ments.”). 
251. See, e.g., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 250, at 5 
(“Though the networks and systems that make up cyberspace are man-made, often pri-
vately owned, and primarily civilian in use, treating cyberspace as a domain is a critical 
organizing concept for DoD’s national security missions. This allows DoD to organize, 
train, and equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support na-
tional security interests.”); see generally INFORMATION OPERATIONS, supra note 250. 
